Corruption in Nagpur RTO: How Licence Applicants Are Hit
- thenewsdirt

- 1 day ago
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A driving licence in Nagpur is meant to be a straightforward proof of eligibility, identity, and driving competence. In practice, many applicants describe a process that stretches into repeated visits, stalled files, and pressure to pay extra money outside the official fee structure.
For many in Vidarbha, the stakes are basic and immediate, including commuting to work, meeting employer requirements, and avoiding fines during routine traffic checks.
The gap between the published rules and what applicants experience is visible at the earliest stages, beginning with learner licence tests and continuing through the permanent driving test.
The record of complaints, police entries, and enforcement actions shows recurring allegations that the system is vulnerable at points where discretion, queue control, and technical bottlenecks intersect.
A licence process that becomes a grind
The formal pathway is clear on paper. A learner's licence is required before a permanent driving licence, and the learner stage involves an online test based on prescribed questions.
After the learner stage, the applicant books and appears for the driving competence test for the permanent licence.
The official Maharashtra transport department fee list shows a charge of ₹151 per class of vehicle for a learner licence, plus a ₹50 test fee, and ₹716 for a permanent driving licence. It also lists ₹416 for renewal, ₹216 for a duplicate, and ₹1016 for adding another vehicle class in the licence record.
The same page lists document requirements such as proof of address and age, photographs, and medical certification where applicable, indicating a document-heavy process that can stall when scrutiny becomes inconsistent.
National fee information published through the Parivahan portal also lists baseline amounts for licensing services, including ₹150 for issuing a learner licence, ₹50 for the learner test or retest, ₹300 for the driving competence test or retest, and ₹200 for issuing a driving licence.
The existence of multiple fee figures, with state-level totals and national components, matters on the ground because applicants report being confronted with informal “package” prices that are far higher than any official schedule.
Delays are not only created by paperwork. Technical problems and slow systems have been described as daily obstacles that stop counters from moving and keep applicants in waiting areas longer than planned. A 2017 report from Nagpur described applicants complaining that the licensing portal and related systems faced frequent glitches and poor internet connectivity, disrupting routine operations linked to driving licence services.
The same report described how even assistance centres set up to help citizens file online forms could become an additional cost burden, with a listed small fee per task, but actual charges several times higher. When online services lag, applicants who expected a largely digital process often end up back at the office for clarifications, printouts, and repeated verification, adding travel costs and lost work hours.
Local accounts from earlier years describe a physical queue culture that still influences how applicants experience the office.
A ground report from Nagpur described licence seekers arriving in the morning and waiting through the day, relying on token numbers and facing uncertainty about whether their number would be called.
The same account contrasted individual applicants with those who approached through driving schools, describing a faster, managed path for the latter, including quicker completion and less time spent standing in line.
Where money changes hands in the Nagpur licence market
The pattern seen across multiple years of reporting is not limited to isolated bribe demands. It includes a broader brokerage system that thrives on congestion, uncertainty, and the fear of failing a test or losing an appointment slot.
Across Vidarbha, applicants repeatedly encounter the idea that an agent, not the official queue, determines how quickly a licence moves.
One part of the system is the sale of convenience. When portals are slow or counters are backed up, applicants often look for shortcuts, and intermediaries offer them, sometimes openly. A 2017 Nagpur report described the role of facilitation centres and suggested that an official low fee for help with online tasks could turn into much higher charges, framed as an unavoidable cost of getting the work done on time.
In such conditions, the first payment is not always a direct bribe to a public servant, but it functions as an entry fee into a faster track.
A second part is the sale of outcomes. A series of reports starting in 2018 described allegations that learner licence tests were conducted in ways that benefited those routed through brokers. These accounts described a system in which “special tests” were arranged, and outsiders helped applicants clear the test.
Sources cited in those reports described intermediaries operating inside or around the office space, with applicants being guided through steps that ordinary visitors struggled to navigate alone.
The most concrete description of the “package” economy appears in reporting linked to the learner licence test scam investigations. A 2018 report described a claimed package system in which a two-wheeler licence package cost around ₹1,500, while a combined two-wheeler and car package could range from ₹2,500 to ₹3,500.
These amounts were framed as service charges paid through intermediaries, not as official fees. Even when applicants still paid the normal government charges, the package amount functioned as the price of avoiding uncertainty.
The reporting also claimed that intermediaries marked applications in subtle ways so that staff could identify which applicants were on the paid track and ensure their process went smoothly.
A third part is the use of “VIP” handling inside the licensing workflow. In the reporting on the learner licence test scam, internal records were described as showing unusually high numbers of candidates processed under a “VIP mode,” suggesting a structured way to separate applicants into categories.
This matters for citizens because it creates a predictable experience for those who pay and an unpredictable one for those who do not, even when both groups submit the same documents.
Investigations, traps, and records showing irregular tests
The best documented allegations of organised wrongdoing around licensing in Nagpur are tied to learner licence tests conducted outside normal conditions and to specific anti-corruption actions alleging bribery in licence issuance.
In June 2018, a report described how learner licence tests were allegedly conducted after office hours and on government holidays.
A related report stated that, per an RTI-based finding, the Nagpur city office was allotted 264 slots per day for learner licence tests through online applications. It then contrasted that with the claim that an assistant motor vehicle inspector conducted about 7,000 tests in January 2018, which would average 318 tests per day if the month had 22 working days.
The implication presented in that reporting was that these numbers were difficult to reconcile without tests being conducted outside the standard schedule. This report also described that tests were being run from IP addresses other than the official office IP, pointing to possible use of external computers and locations.
Another June 2018 report stated that the office was looking to involve the National Informatics Centre in examining the IP address issue, with sources hinting that learner licence tests were conducted with the help of intermediaries.
The same report described the existence of unusually high pass rates in internal reporting and alleged manipulation in how failures were recorded, presented as a way to avoid scrutiny. It also stated that in January 2018, one official was recorded as having conducted 6,997 learner licence tests, with 6,535 passes and 462 failures, and that 4,898 candidates appeared under a “VIP mode.”
These numbers matter for citizens because they indicate the scale at which a compromised process can operate and how many applicants are pulled into a system where outcomes may depend less on preparation and more on access to a broker.
By September 2019, reporting described escalation into formal complaint mechanisms. One report stated that the transport commissioner directed the city office to lodge police complaints against nine officials, mostly assistant motor vehicle inspectors, and eight agents, based on a cyber cell inquiry report indicating irregularities in learner licence tests.
The same report quoted a senior police station official saying the complaint ran into many pages and the police had not yet registered a case, indicating procedural delays even after the decision to lodge a complaint. The report also stated that some tests were conducted in cyber cafés and that many of the allegedly involved individuals had been transferred from the city office, indicating an administrative response while the legal process continued.
A separate October 2019 report described arrests of three agents by the Economic Offences Wing in connection with the same learner licence scam. It quoted the investigation officer stating that the agents used IP addresses other than official ones for issuing learner licences and that their role was being examined in relation to officials.
This reporting described a situation where intermediaries were arrested while officials were still being investigated, a detail that shapes public perception because it affects whether applicants believe complaints will reach the decision makers behind the counter.
In February 2020, a report described the Anti-Corruption Bureau beginning an open inquiry against multiple city office officials, stating that the case emerged after an activist exposed irregularities and that the cyber cell established the involvement of 17 persons.
The same report stated that the cyber cell submitted a report of around 1,800 pages to the transport commissioner’s office and that an FIR had been registered against 17 persons, including nine officials and eight outsiders. For citizens, this level of documentation signals that the allegations were not treated as minor procedural lapses and that the claimed wrongdoing involved coordination between insiders and outsiders.
Alongside these broader scam investigations, there are also specific anti-corruption actions linked directly to licence issuance and passing tests. A 2015 report described an anti-corruption trap in Nagpur in which an RTO inspector and an agent were arrested for allegedly taking a bribe of ₹700 to pass a driving test for issuing a licence.
A 2019 report described another anti-corruption trap from April 2018, stating that an official and a broker were arrested for allegedly accepting a ₹2,000 bribe for issuing a licence, with the case registered at Sitabuldi police station. While these are individual cases, they demonstrate the basic mechanism applicants describe, meaning money demanded at the moment of evaluation or file clearance.
The shift to more digital “faceless” systems has not eliminated attempts to bypass the process.
An August 2025 report stated that the Nagpur City office cancelled the learner licences of three individuals after an internal probe found that they shared Aadhaar-linked OTPs with third parties who took the online tests on their behalf.
The report stated that a complaint was lodged at Sitabuldi police station, that evidence, including audio recordings, was submitted, and that police coordination was ongoing. The report quoted a senior police station official saying verification and documentation were being sought before legal action, and it quoted the regional transport officer stating that OTP sharing to let someone else take the test was a violation that undermined system credibility.
For citizens, this case matters because it shows that the market for “help clearing the test” can relocate from the office premises to digital channels, creating a quieter form of fraud that still disadvantages those who follow the rules.
What applicants lose in money and time
The cost of licensing corruption in Nagpur is measurable in repeat visits, payments to intermediaries, and the emotional strain of being treated as a problem rather than a customer of a public service.
The first loss is time, and it often begins before the test itself. When portals fail, internet connectivity is poor, or counters move slowly, applicants spend hours waiting for a step that should take minutes. The 2017 report from Nagpur included a driving licence applicant’s statement describing daily technical glitches and poor internet connectivity as a constant obstacle for routine operations.
Such delays do not remain abstract. They translate into missed work, rescheduled tests, and additional travel to the office for small corrections.
The second loss is money beyond the published fee schedule. The Maharashtra transport department’s own fee list shows that official charges for a learner licence and test are in the low hundreds of rupees per category, and the permanent licence total is stated as ₹716.
Yet the “package” amounts linked to the learner licence scam were in the thousands, including ₹1,500 for a two-wheeler licence package and ₹2,500 to ₹3,500 for a combined two-wheeler and car outcome.
Even if these package payments are framed as “service fees” for assistance, citizens experience them as the price of avoiding failure, delay, or rejection. In Vidarbha, where wages for many workers are daily rather than salaried, paying an extra few thousand rupees can equal multiple days of income.
The third loss is certainty. In a clean system, applicants know what happens next if they fail, what to fix if their documents are incomplete, and when they can book the next slot. In a compromised system, applicants report a different logic, where small errors can be used as a reason to send them away, while paid applicants move forward smoothly.
The learner licence scam reports described application markings and “VIP mode” routing, implying that some applicants are pre-selected for a smoother ride. That perceived selectivity affects how citizens interpret every instruction and rejection at the counter.
The fourth loss is trust in the meaning of the licence itself. When investigations report that a large number of learner tests were conducted from non-official IP addresses or in cyber cafés, or that OTPs were shared so someone else could take the online test, the implication is that the learner licence can be obtained without genuine knowledge.
When anti-corruption traps allege bribes for passing driving tests, the implication is that the permanent licence can be detached from competence. Citizens then face a situation where they are being asked to treat the licence as proof of safety, while also hearing repeated allegations that it can be purchased or arranged.
Corruption in the licensing channel does not always look like a direct bribe demand to every applicant. It can look like an office where slow systems create dependence on paid helpers, where intermediaries dominate access, and where the rules are applied with uneven intensity.
It can look like a digital test that is meant to remove human interference, but is bypassed through OTP sharing. In Vidarbha, the result is a licensing experience that many citizens describe as a test of persistence and payment rather than a test of driving knowledge and skill.
FAQs
Q: What are the common corruption points during the Nagpur RTO driving licence application and driving test?
A: Corruption allegations reported in Nagpur have included bribe demands to pass driving tests, paid “package” handling through agents, and irregular learner licence test conduct involving non-official systems or third-party assistance.
Q: What are the reported costs of agents and bribes for getting a driving licence in Nagpur?
A: Reports have described agent “packages” in the ₹1,500 to ₹3,500 range for learner and licence related outcomes, and anti corruption cases have alleged bribes such as ₹700 to pass a driving test and ₹2,000 to issue a licence in specific incidents.
References
Motor Vehicles Department, Maharashtra. (2026, January 9). अनुज्ञप्ती Fees. Retrieved February 19, 2026, from https://transport.maharashtra.gov.in/1176/License-Fees
Parivahan Sewa, Ministry of Road Transport & Highways, Government of India. (n.d.). Licensing related fees and charges (PDF). Retrieved February 19, 2026, from https://staging.parivahan.nic.in/parivahan/en/print/pdf/node/12
Chakraborty, P. (2013, May 9). RTO premises turned torture fields. Nagpur Today. Retrieved February 19, 2026, from https://www.nagpurtoday.in/rto-premises-turned-torture-fields/05091100
Chakraborty, P. (2015, September 2). Bribe: RTO inspector, agent nabbed. Retrieved February 19, 2026, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/bribe-rto-inspector-agent-nabbed/articleshow/48765249.cms
Chakraborty, P. (2017, July 11). Breakdowns of RTO portals irk applicants. Retrieved February 19, 2026, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/breakdowns-of-rto-portals-irk-applicants/articleshow/59535021.cms
Chakraborty, P. (2018, June 19). RTO to seek NIC help to probe learner’s licence test scam. Retrieved February 19, 2026, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/rto-to-seek-nic-help-to-probe-learners-licence-test-scam/articleshow/64639936.cms
Chakraborty, P. (2018, June 20). RTO shunts 2 officials involved in learner's licence test scam. Retrieved February 19, 2026, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/rto-shunts-2-officials-involved-in-learneraposs-licence-test-scam/articleshow/64654748.cms
Deshpande, V. (2019, December 28). RTO official booked for having disproportionate assets. Retrieved February 19, 2026, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/rto-official-booked-for-having-disproportionate-assets/articleshow/73000996.cms
Chakraborty, P. (2019, September 27). RTO asked to file police complaint in learners’ licence scam. Retrieved February 19, 2026, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/rto-asked-to-file-police-complaint-in-learners-licence-scam/articleshow/71318007.cms
Chakraborty, P. (2019, October 20). LL scam: 3 agents arrested, tainted RTO officials still out. Retrieved February 19, 2026, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/ll-scam-3-agents-arrested-tainted-rto-officials-still-out/articleshow/71665491.cms
Chakraborty, P. (2020, February 12). ACB starts inquiry into learners’ licence scam. Retrieved February 19, 2026, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/acb-starts-inquiry-into-learners-licence-scam/articleshow/74089077.cms
Chakraborty, P. (2021, May 19). Fake DL racket busted, terror angle to be probed. Retrieved February 19, 2026, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/fake-dl-racket-busted-terror-angle-to-be-probed/articleshow/82751072.cms
Ghulghule, V. (2025, August 2). RTO detects misuse of eKYC-based faceless system, 3 learner licences cancelled. Retrieved February 19, 2026, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/rto-detects-misuse-of-ekyc-based-faceless-system-3-learner-licences-cancelled/articleshow/123050140.cms



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