Are Fertilisers Reaching Vidarbha’s Farmers on Time Despite iFMS?
- thenewsdirt
- Jun 24
- 7 min read

Government reports consistently claim "adequate" fertiliser supplies across Maharashtra, yet farmers in Vidarbha continue to struggle with urea shortages, DAP black market purchases, and spurious agricultural products during critical sowing seasons.
The Integrated Fertiliser Management System (iFMS), launched in 2016 to revolutionise fertiliser distribution through real-time tracking, appears to be monitoring the agricultural crisis rather than solving it.
District-Level Fertiliser Supply Shortfalls Expose Maharashtra Agricultural Crisis
The disparity between official fertiliser availability claims and ground reality becomes stark when examining district-level agricultural data for Yavatmal and Akola.
During Kharif 2022, Akola district received only 73.5% of its sanctioned urea allocation, with actual fertiliser availability at 17,321 metric tonnes against a sanctioned 23,560 metric tonnes. The situation was similarly dire for phosphatic and potassic fertilisers, where only 70.5% of the sanctioned quantity reached farmers in the district.
Yavatmal district fared marginally better but still fell short of Maharashtra government targets, receiving 77% of sanctioned urea and 71% of P&K fertilisers. The Rabi 2022-23 season painted an even grimmer picture for agricultural supply chains. Akola received a mere 14.4% of its planned urea allocation, just 2,200 metric tonnes against a seasonal fertiliser plan of 15,230 metric tonnes.
Yavatmal's agricultural receipts stood at 38.3% of the plan, with only 28,091 metric tonnes arriving against the targeted 73,390 metric tonnes.
These agricultural supply figures directly contradict state-level reports that describe fertiliser availability as "comfortable" or "adequate" throughout the period.
Maharashtra accounts for 9.5% of India's total fertiliser consumption, making it the third-largest agricultural consuming state. The state's nutrient consumption increased by 3.4% from 2022-23 to 2023-24, yet the iFMS distribution system consistently failed to meet district-level targets for Vidarbha farmers.
The iFMS system, designed to manage over 640 lakh metric tonnes of fertiliser annually through 18 crore transactions, successfully tracks these shortfalls but appears unable to prevent them.
The Department of Fertilisers conducts weekly video conferences with state officials to address availability issues, yet the gaps persist year after year.
Urea Black Market Thrives Despite iFMS Digital Monitoring in Maharashtra
The price differential between subsidised and market rates has created a thriving parallel economy. Urea, sold at the subsidised rate of Rs 266 per 45kg bag, commands up to Rs 2,500 in black markets, nearly ten times the official price. This massive disparity drives large-scale diversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses, despite continuous monitoring through point-of-sale devices and Aadhaar-based authentication.
Farmers face a cruel choice of waiting for official supplies that may never arrive during critical sowing windows, or pay inflated prices that push them deeper into debt.
The narrow sowing periods in Vidarbha, typically mid-June to mid-July for major Kharif crops, leave no room for delays.
Cotton, the region's primary cash crop, requires precise timing after monsoon onset. Any delay forces farmers to re-sow, multiplying input costs.
The India Meteorological Department revised the monsoon onset date for Vidarbha from June 10 to June 15 in 2019, acknowledging systematic delays that had become routine. Reports indicate that delayed rains have forced multiple re-sowing episodes, sharply increasing costs for farmers already operating on thin margins.
Spurious products compound the problem. In April 2022, authorities in Yavatmal seized fake Bt cotton seeds worth Rs 28 lakh, tracing them to an inter-state network. The reactive approach to quality control means verification often occurs only after farmers file complaints, leading to substantial losses.
A study in Akola and Amravati revealed that 45% of vegetable growers identified problems with chemicals and fertilisers as significant constraints.
Micronutrient Deficiency Crisis Plagues Vidarbha Agricultural Soil Health
While agricultural policy focus remains on macronutrients like nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium, Vidarbha's agricultural soils suffer from widespread micronutrient deficiencies that receive minimal government attention.
Comprehensive soil health analyses conducted in March 2025 revealed critically low organic carbon content in agricultural land, with a mean of 0.38%, indicating soil depletion from intensive farming practices across Vidarbha's cotton-growing regions.
Available nitrogen levels in agricultural soil averaged 139.44 kg per hectare, with most samples falling below critical thresholds for optimal crop production. More concerning were the spatial variations in zinc, boron, and iron availability across Vidarbha's agricultural landscape.
Zinc and boron deficiencies are common in acidic agricultural soils, while zinc and iron shortages plague semi-arid farming regions, both characteristics of Vidarbha's agricultural zones.
The fertiliser subsidy structure reinforces this agricultural imbalance. The 2023-24 fertiliser subsidy budget allocated Rs 1,28,594 crore for urea and Rs 60,300 crore for phosphatic and potassic fertilisers, while organic fertilisers received just Rs 150 crore for 2025-26.
This creates economic incentives that drive farmers towards primary nutrients while neglecting secondary and micronutrients essential for soil health and agricultural productivity.
The Nutrient-Based Subsidy scheme for P&K fertilisers, introduced in 2010, provides fixed subsidies based on nutrient content. However, the substantial and fixed subsidy on urea creates price distortions that skew the NPK use ratio to 10.9:4.4:1 in 2023-24, far from the recommended balanced application.
Micronutrient-fortified fertilisers receive additional subsidies, but the amounts are insufficient to overcome the economic bias towards urea.
System Failures and Farmer Distress

The convergence of supply shortfalls, price manipulation, and quality concerns has eroded farmer trust in the formal distribution system.
The assessment notes that "farmers, it seems, have lost faith in the system," compelling them to seek inputs through informal channels that inflate costs and expose them to substandard products.
Yavatmal district exemplifies the broader crisis. Cotton cultivation spans 4,83,998 hectares, with soybean covering 2,72,898 hectares. The near-universal adoption of Bt cotton, 97% to 100% among cotton farmers, creates additional vulnerabilities. This genetically modified variety demands higher input costs and is particularly sensitive to water shortages, making precise fertiliser application critical for viable yields.
The region's dependence on rainfed agriculture amplifies these challenges. Approximately 93% of Vidarbha's cultivable land lacks assured irrigation, making farming highly susceptible to rainfall variations. Average annual rainfall in Yavatmal ranges from 911 to 927 millimetres, concentrated during the southwest monsoon. Erratic patterns, including destructive downpours or unseasonal rains during harvest, frequently destroy crops.
Comprehensive soil health management requires site-specific nutrient strategies that address both macronutrient and micronutrient needs. However, the current system's focus on tracking and distributing primary fertilisers leaves secondary and micronutrient requirements largely unaddressed. The decline in farmyard manure application, coupled with increased chemical fertiliser dependence, has accelerated soil degradation.
The iFMS system processes subsidy claims weekly and maintains real-time dashboards monitoring stock levels, sales analysis, and expenditure.
This technological infrastructure provides unprecedented visibility into the fertiliser supply chain, yet the persistent problems suggest that monitoring alone cannot address structural inefficiencies and market distortions.
The system's sophisticated tracking capabilities reveal the extent of black marketing and supply gaps but lack the enforcement mechanisms to prevent these issues. State governments possess powers under the Essential Commodities Act 1955 and Fertiliser Control Order 1985 to take punitive action, yet the effectiveness of these measures remains questionable given the continued prevalence of malpractices.
The agricultural calendar in Vidarbha demands precision in input delivery that the current system struggles to provide.
While iFMS captures sales data at retail points, this information may not reflect the conditions under which farmers acquire fertilisers, whether at inflated prices, through forced bundling, or with quality compromises that undermine agricultural outcomes.
The gap between state-level "adequate" availability and district-level shortfalls highlights fundamental flaws in distribution planning and execution. The technology exists to track every transaction, yet the inability to ensure equitable and timely access at the farm gate exposes the limitations of digital solutions in addressing complex agricultural supply chain challenges.
Farmers in Vidarbha continue to bear the cost of these systemic failures through increased input expenses, crop losses, and mounting debt. The region's notorious association with farmer suicides reflects the broader agrarian distress that inadequate and untimely input supply contributes to maintaining.
Until the gap between digital monitoring and physical delivery is bridged, the promise of transparent and efficient fertiliser distribution will remain unfulfilled for those who need it most.
References
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