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Gosikhurd Project: ₹25,000 Crore Spent, Irrigation Still Out of Reach in Vidarbha

Gosikhurd Project: ₹25,000 Crore Spent, Irrigation Still Out of Reach in Vidarbha
Gosikhurd Project: ₹25,000 Crore Spent, Irrigation Still Out of Reach in Vidarbha

The Gosikhurd National Irrigation Project, launched over forty years ago, was meant to transform irrigation in the Vidarbha region.


Instead, it has turned into one of the most prolonged and expensive infrastructure failures in Indian history.


From its ambitious beginning to the current state of uncertainty, the project has left a deep impact on finances, administration, and thousands of lives.



A Beginning Marked by Oversight


The Gosikhurd project was cleared in March 1983 to irrigate 2,50,800 hectares across Bhandara, Nagpur, and Chandrapur districts.


It was expected to serve multiple purposes of irrigation, drinking water, hydropower, industrial supply, and fisheries.

Built on the Wainganga River, part of the Godavari basin, the project included an earthen dam, a spillway, left and right bank canals, lift irrigation schemes, and expansion of the Asolamendha tank.


The initial cost was estimated at ₹372 crore, which was seen as reasonable given its scope.


The foundation stone was laid by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in October 1984. Later that year, Rajiv Gandhi inaugurated the work formally. However, early signs of misjudgment were already present.



Surveys failed to fully assess the area’s geology, land acquisition demands, and the scale of displacement. These gaps would cause problems that resurfaced at every phase of the project’s life.


Overlaps in command area, miscalculated land requirements, and lack of environmental clearances disrupted work soon after it began.

Villages were affected without complete rehabilitation plans, and important groundwork was delayed because of poor assessments. The project began to drift away from its schedule before construction even picked up pace.


Soaring Costs, Sinking Confidence


Cost overruns in public projects are not unusual, but Gosikhurd's figures stand out. The jump from ₹372 crore in 1982 to ₹25,972.69 crore in 2025 reflects a nearly 6,900% increase.


The first major escalation came in 2007 when the cost was revised to ₹7,778 crore. It rose again to ₹13,739 crore in 2012, followed by ₹18,500 crore in 2016, and finally ₹25,972.69 crore in the latest revision.

These spikes mirrored institutional lapses and repeated failures in scope management.


In 2017, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) found that despite spending ₹9,712 crore, the project had achieved only 20% of its expected irrigation coverage.


As of the latest reports, water delivered reached just 1,582 hectares, less than 1% of the original promise.


Investigations by the Anti-Corruption Bureau uncovered irregularities in contractor selection and fund usage.



Contracts were given out in violation of rules, with undue benefits extended to private players. Several agreements were cancelled, but by then, substandard work had already progressed too far.

Poor oversight by departments meant that faulty work often went unnoticed or unpunished, adding to delays and wastage.


At the same time, the Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority had approved 189 projects between 2007 and 2013 without a proper State Water Resource Plan. Gosikhurd was one among them.


The audit revealed that administrative procedures for approvals were inconsistent, and monitoring mechanisms were weak. This absence of control allowed major decisions to move forward without proper scrutiny or coordination.


A Project Without Delivery

Gosikhurd Dam in Vidarbha: A Project Without Delivery
Gosikhurd Dam in Vidarbha: A Project Without Delivery

Four decades later, the project remains incomplete. Out of the promised irrigation potential of 2,50,800 hectares, only about 35,000 hectares have been reached.


In 2025, the approved irrigation potential was officially reduced to 1,96,600 hectares, though even this revised goal appears far from being achieved.

One of the main issues lies in the incomplete canal network. Water is available in the dam, but lakhs of farmers cannot access it because the canals to transport it to the fields are still under construction. This mismatch between availability and delivery has rendered the project ineffective on the ground.


Legal issues and administrative hurdles have also affected the pace of construction. Land acquisition problems, delays in tendering, and technical changes due to earlier errors continue to interrupt progress.



Each delay adds to cost, which in turn affects funding, especially since the project is classified as a national project, with 90% of funding from the Centre and 10% from the state. The Central Water Commission has raised concerns about viability and accountability, slowing down fund releases.



A project meant to offer relief to Vidarbha’s drought-affected regions now faces uncertainty not because of natural challenges, but because of bureaucratic and financial disarray.


Beyond delays and costs, the Gosikhurd project has created large-scale displacement. Around 249 villages were impacted due to the submergence zone.

Thousands of families had to relocate, but the compensation and rehabilitation efforts have not kept pace with the scale of the problem. Many people are still without proper housing, land, or support systems that could allow them to rebuild their lives.


The environmental toll is also significant. The dam was supposed to supply clean water for drinking and industrial use, but pollution from upstream sources has degraded the reservoir's quality.


Sewage from Nagpur city enters the reservoir through the Nag River, along with industrial and agricultural pollutants from contributing rivers. This contamination reduces the usability of the water and poses health risks for nearby communities.

Environmental safeguards during project planning were either skipped or implemented poorly. The resulting water quality issues now require further investment to fix, a cost not originally planned for. These problems were foreseeable had there been proper environmental assessments at the early stages of the project.



The Cost of Mismanagement


The Gosikhurd project reflects more than just technical or financial failure. It exposes deep-rooted weaknesses in project planning, regulation, and governance. Despite the intended benefits and significant resource allocation, the project has yet to serve the region it was built.


Vidarbha, where irrigation is crucial for farmers, continues to wait for results that have remained elusive for decades.

The long delay in delivery, repeated cost escalations, incomplete infrastructure, environmental damage, and human displacement all point to an outcome that was avoidable.


Funds have been spent, approvals revised, and audits submitted, but the project still lacks the essential elements needed for completion.


As the canals remain unfinished and the project continues to consume public funds, the Gosikhurd experience stands as a stark example of how unchecked mismanagement can transform an infrastructure vision into a prolonged liability.



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